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I. Introduction  
 
The Federal Communications Commission is poised to repeal its 2015 Title II reclassification 
order (Title II Order).1 That decision subjected cutting-edge broadband providers to a common 
carrier regime originally designed to discipline the old Bell Telephone monopoly, as a means of 
satisfying President Obama’s request for “strong net neutrality rules” to govern the 
telecommunications network of the future. This past May, the agency circulated a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking that seeks to reverse that decision and restore the “light touch” regulatory 
regime that governed most broadband providers since the Internet’s inception.2  
 
On the eve of that action, which could occur as early as next month, it is worth revisiting the 
arguments offered in support of the 2015 Title II Order. At base, net neutrality seeks to prevent 
Internet service providers from interfering in upstream markets for Internet-based content and 
applications. But this harm was both largely conjectural and adequately addressed by existing 
antitrust law. The order’s prophylactic rules thus provide little additional protection, while 
barring potentially consumer-beneficial innovation and implicating broadband providers’ First 
Amendment rights. Moreover, the Title II reclassification required to support the rules was both 
bad law and bad policy. 
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II. The Specious Case for Net Neutrality 
 
Although “net neutrality” is a somewhat amorphous term, most would agree that, at its core, it 
represents the idea that broadband providers should allow customers to access all lawful Internet 
content and should treat all traffic the same regardless of source or content. The movement 
focuses on broadband providers because of their allegedly privileged place in the Internet 
ecosystem: in the words of former FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski, broadband companies 
control the “onramps to the Internet” and thus are supposedly in a unique position to shape the 
flow of information online. 
 
Initially, net neutrality seemed driven by the concern that a broadband provider would suppress 
Internet content that was critical of the company or with which the company disagreed. But this 
was a spurious concern, as no Internet services provider ever did so, and any company that 
would attempt such a move would be pilloried in the press. Perhaps surprisingly, the first 
significant instance of a company suppressing Internet speech with which it disagreed came this 
year, with the silencing of the neo-Nazi news site Daily Stormer following the Charlottesville 
Unite the Right Rally. But the culprit was not a broadband provider; it was instead GoDaddy and 
Google (which refused hosting services)3 and Cloudflare (which refused to protect the site from 
denial-of-service attacks).4 The Daily Stormer incident illustrates that there are multiple pressure 
points in the Internet ecosystem, which calls into question the assumption by net neutrality 
advocates that broadband providers pose a unique threat to Internet content. 
 
Net neutrality proponents also feared that broadband providers would engage in anticompetitive 
conduct. One concern is that broadband providers would exploit their positions in broadband 
markets to give affiliated companies (such as cable services) an unfair advantage against 
Internet-based rivals (like Netflix). And even without anticompetitive intent, the 2015 order 
found that broadband providers have “powerful incentives to accept fees from edge providers” to 
exclude competitors or secure priority delivery.5 The order feared that such offerings would 
distort competition among edge providers by giving advantages to well-funded companies that 
can afford priority delivery over those who lack the resources to do so. 
 
Antitrust scholars recognize this as a classic example of vertical foreclosure. They also recognize 
that vertical agreements rarely have negative effects on consumer welfare.6 One significant 
empirical study explains that according to the data, “efficiency considerations overwhelm 
anticompetitive motives in most contexts” and even in natural monopolies or oligopolistic 
markets, “the evidence of anticompetitive harm is not strong.”7 Therefore “under most 
circumstances, profit-maximizing vertical-integration decisions are efficient, not just from the 
firms’ but also from the consumers’ point of view.”8 As law professor and former FTC 
Commissioner Joshua Wright explains, “the economic theory literature establishes that vertical 
restraints may be anticompetitive, but the empirical literature clearly demonstrates that they most 
often are not, and are instead generally procompetitive.”9 
 
Experience in the broadband industry supports Commissioner Wright’s observation. For all the 
strum und drang about net neutrality, one can identify only two instances of arguably 
anticompetitive behavior by Internet access providers. In 2005, Madison River Communications 
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paid a $15,000 fine to settle FCC charges that it blocked third-party VOIP services from 
operating on its broadband network, allegedly because these VOIP providers competed against 
the company’s traditional telephone service.10 Three years later, the FCC fined Comcast for 
throttling BitTorrent traffic on its broadband network. While Comcast claimed throttling was 
necessary to prevent a BitTorrent user from overwhelming the limited upload bandwidth shared 
within a local area, critics argued that the company sought to limit traffic in copyrighted movies 
(which comprised the bulk of BitTorrent traffic at the time) to protect the company’s video-on-
demand products.11 One could argue that, with net neutrality never far from the Commission’s 
mind, the threat of potential regulation may have deterred other anticompetitive abuses.12 But the 
fact remains that two complaints in twenty years reflects a healthy industry, not one in need of 
regulatory intervention. As critics often claimed, net neutrality was always a solution in search of 
a problem. 
 
Moreover, it is easy to imagine instances wherein paid prioritization might be helpful to 
consumers. Different Internet applications have different sensitivities to congestion. A consumer 
is unlikely to notice trivial congestion-related delays when loading an email or a webpage. But 
such delays can significantly erode the quality of a video stream or videoconferencing service. 
Allowing such applications to insulate themselves from congestion would improve the user 
experience for these consumers without adversely affecting consumers of congestion-insensitive 
services. In this way, paid prioritization could improve the overall Internet experience: the price 
mechanism signals which applications are most susceptible to congestion and allocates them 
greater bandwidth during congested times – just as prices allocate scarce resources in most other 
parts of a capitalist economy. 
 
One of the Title II Order’s biggest flaws is its failure to appreciate the possibility that some – 
perhaps many – forms of prioritization may in fact benefit consumers. Though the 2015 order 
acknowledges that “some forms of paid prioritization could be beneficial,” it nonetheless finds 
that “the threat of harm is overwhelming” and “simply too great” to allow experimentation.13 
The order’s per se prohibition on paid prioritization is thus a policy choice to block potentially 
consumer-welfare-enhancing business models because of an overwhelming fear of 
anticompetitive abuse. In this way, the net neutrality rules are even more stringent than the 
requirements that Title II placed on the old Bell Telephone monopoly, which could offer 
different tiers of service as long as each tier was available at tariffed rates.14 
 
Indeed, even the post office – America’s quintessential “common carrier” – can offer paid 
prioritization: first class mail is available to everyone, but those who need their packages 
delivered faster can pay a premium for priority or next-day delivery. Net neutrality’s refusal to 
offer similar flexibility to broadband providers because of a paranoid risk of anticompetitive 
abuse is somewhat bizarre, especially since antitrust law already exists to protect consumers 
from the harm that proponents most fear. In essence, the law prohibits a potentially significant 
amount of pro-consumer behavior in the interest of securing some (undefined) marginal 
consumer protection above and beyond that already afforded by antitrust.  
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III. The Title II Order and First Amendment Rights of Broadband Providers 
 
Broadband providers can – and have – argued that strong net neutrality rules violate the First 
Amendment. The Supreme Court has long recognized that speech conduits such as newspapers 
and cable providers have a First Amendment right of editorial control that limits the 
government’s ability to force them to deliver speech against their will.15 Some commentators 
have argued that because broadband providers simply transmit messages requested by 
consumers, they do not make editorial decisions and therefore are not analogous to these other 
entities.16 But when presented with this argument, the D.C. Circuit court reviewing the 2015 
order curiously sidestepped the question. It held that because, by definition, broadband providers 
covered by the 2015 order held themselves out as offering access to all or virtually all Internet 
endpoints, it does not violate the First Amendment to hold them to that commitment.17 
Interestingly, the court explained that “insofar as a broadband provider might offer its own 
content…separate from its internet access service, the provider would receive the same 
protection under the First Amendment as other producers of internet content.”18 
 
In his opinion concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc, panel judge Sri Srinivasan reiterated 
that “an ISP that offers subscribers a curated experience by blocking websites lying beyond a 
specified field of content” or otherwise “making sufficiently clear to potential customers that it 
provides a filtered service” would exercise editorial discretion and would lie outside the scope of 
the FCC’s rules.19 This consumer protection-focused view of net neutrality suggests that an ISP 
can behave in a non-net-neutral fashion as long as it makes clear to consumers that it is doing so. 
While this understanding is somewhat at odds with the beliefs of the FCC and most net neutrality 
advocates, it might have been necessary to avoid a more serious First Amendment question. But 
the court’s discussion of the First Amendment issue begs the question what work the rules are 
doing if a company can opt out of the legal regime merely by stating clearly that it does not offer 
indiscriminate service to all or nearly all Internet content. 
 
IV. The Harm of Title II Reclassification 
 
Perhaps the most controversial portion of the 2015 order was the Commission’s decision to 
reclassify broadband providers as Title II common carriers. The Commission had previously 
gone all the way to the Supreme Court to defend its determination that broadband Internet access 
providers were not Title II common carriers, but were instead information service providers 
under Title I and were, at most, lightly regulated.20 This was the regime that governed most 
Internet service providers from broadband’s infancy. But in Verizon v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit 
held that the Commission could not prohibit all paid prioritization under Title I, because this 
would effectively impose common carriage obligations on non-common carriage companies in 
violation of a different portion of the Communications Act.21 The court explained that a 
prohibition that left room for individual companies to bargain would have been permissible, and 
on remand the FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking favored this path. But then-President 
Obama declared his support for “strong net neutrality rules” and recommended the agency avoid 
the problem identified by the Verizon court by reclassifying broadband Internet service providers 
as Title II common carriers – a decision that the D.C. Circuit ultimately upheld in United States 
Telecom Association v. FCC. 
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It was this reclassification decision, more than the net neutrality rules themselves, that the 
reconstituted Commission has taken issue with in the 2017 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. And 
with good reason. Although the D.C. Circuit properly followed the Supreme Court’s earlier 
holding that the statute was ambiguous about the proper classification of broadband Internet 
access, broadband does not fit well within the Act’s definition of a Title II service. The Act 
explains that “telecommunications,” providers of which are governed by Title II, is “the 
transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user’s 
choosing, without change in form or content of the information as sent and received.”22 By 
comparison, an “information service,” which falls under Title I, is “the offering of a capability 
for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making 
available information via telecommunications.”23 As the 2017 NPRM explains, broadband access 
more closely fits the latter category. Consumers use broadband access to engage in activities 
such as “generating” and “making available” blog posts or status updates, “storing” and 
“utilizing” an address book or grocery list, or “transforming” and “processing” filtered 
photographs.24 Information transmitted via a broadband connection is not “between or among 
points specified by the user.” Routing decisions are instead chosen by network architecture, with 
the user having little to no knowledge of where the information is stored and instead dependent 
upon functions such as DNS lookup and local caching to retrieve desired content.25 In short, 
broadband service is “the offering of a capability” to manipulate information stored online, 
which falls much more comfortably into Title I. 
 
Moreover, the Commission notes that the imposition of a complex and onerous regulatory 
regime is likely to deter investment in broadband networks. The Commission cited, among other 
studies, an analysis by Free State Foundation Research Associate Michael Horney showing that 
broadband investment slowed by $5.6 billion since the imposition of the Title II regime in the 
2015 order.26 Other analysts have reached similar conclusions.27 Free Press, an ardent net 
neutrality supporter, has challenged these findings and produced its own report showing an 
increase in spending,28 though as critics note, this study improperly includes non-broadband 
spending such as AT&T’s capital investments in Mexico and costs associated with its purchase 
of DirecTV.29 
 
But the broader harm of reclassification is the damage done to innovation in the broadband 
space. The public utility regime contemplated by Title II works best in stodgy, unchanging 
industries like water delivery that uneventfully fulfill the same service to consumers each year. 
These rigid rules are ill-suited to an industry as dynamic as the Internet ecosystem. Title II 
regulation exhibits a status quo bias, a belief that the way the Internet currently runs is the way it 
should always run, and for all people. Perhaps in the early days of the Internet, when consumers 
were mostly using their network connections for the same basic activities of email and web 
surfing, a one-size-fits-all, static access model posed less of a risk to innovation. But as more of 
our daily activities move online, the broadband user base has grown both more heterogeneous, 
meaning the same old one-size-fits-all model may not be optimal for all users. 
 
As a real-world example, many countries feature wireless providers that offer unlimited talk, 
text, and Facebook or Twitter access for a lower rate than a plan incorporating all Internet 
content. I would love such a phone for my teenage daughter, who routinely exceeds the monthly 
data allowance of our shared plan and spends 95% of her time online using Instagram. So when 
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Sprint teased a similar plan in the United States, I was interested. But the plan immediately came 
under fire by net neutrality advocates for offering only certain social media applications rather 
than all lawful Internet content, and ultimately Sprint dropped its plans. Similar criticism faced 
T-Mobile’s decision to zero-rate music and later to zero-rate low-resolution video. Yet these 
plans were critical to T-Mobile’s successful effort to gain market share and lure away customers 
whose needs were imperfectly satisfied by a traditional mobile broadband plan. 
 
By biasing the status quo, Title II classification discourages this type of experimentation by 
broadband Internet access providers. And the amount of regulatory authority afforded the FCC 
by Title II could stifle a dynamic market for broadband access. Though the Commission has 
forborne from applying several parts of Title II, these forbearances are a notice-and-comment 
exercise away from repeal. Title II thus hangs like a Sword of Damocles over broadband 
providers, and the Commission is absolutely right to propose freeing them from this ongoing 
threat. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Ultimately, the ongoing seesaw battle over net neutrality is a problem that Congress created. As 
the late Justice Antonin Scalia wrote, “[i]t would be gross understatement to say that the…Act is 
not a model of clarity. It is in many important respects a model of ambiguity or indeed even self-
contradiction.”30 The Communications Act’s unnecessarily obtuse language and vague 
definitions, coupled with its relative lack of reference of broadband networks, opens the door for 
successive agencies to interpret and reinterpret Congress’s meaning. As Justice Scalia noted, this 
“is most unfortunate for a piece of legislation that profoundly affects a crucial segment of the 
economy worth tens of billions of dollars.”31 
 
But if the problem ultimately lies with Congress, so too does the solution. For the last two 
decades, the Act has led the FCC to develop a makeshift “law of the Internet” from the detritus 
of the “law of the telephone” regime. Rather than forcing the agency to continue hammering 
square pegs into round holes, Congress should settle definitively the scope of the Federal 
Communications Commission’s authority to regulate the primary communications network of 
the early 21st century. 
 
The Commission’s 2017 NPRM is a positive step toward this final goal. It represents the next 
phase of an ongoing dialogue between the agency and the D.C. Circuit about the shortcomings of 
the current statute. By continuing this dialogue, the Commission is continuing to highlight this 
issue to Congress in the hope of prompting it to action. In the meantime, the proposed repeal of 
Title II reclassification will restore the light-touch regulatory framework that historically has 
governed Internet service providers, and which provides room for innovation and growth while 
the gears of the congressional machinery slowly begin to turn. 
 
Although the NPRM left open the ultimate fate of the agency’s net neutrality rules, I hope the 
final order will repeal the rules and again permit broadband providers to pursue innovative new 
business models for consumers, protected from anticompetitive harm and abusive practices by 
the same antitrust and consumer protection laws that govern consumers throughout the rest of the 
American economy. 
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